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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
release of records from subordinates such as the one in the Boske case
is still valid in spite of the Hennings-Moss Act,19 because a sub-
ordinate relies on the departmental order, not 5 U.S.C. §22, as authority
for withholding information. Testifying before the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights, the Attorney General said that the amendment
"wouldn't amount to much" because it would merely prevent people
from incorrectly citing 5 U.S.C. §22 as authority for withholding in-
formation, the true authority being the "executive privilege.
'
"
20
The Trimble case, in conjunction with the "executive privilege,"
leads to the conclusion that the release of government records must
be determined by the branch of government which controls them. This
conclusion will sound harsh to those who advocate less secrecy in
government. However, any attempt to decrease secrecy in government
must proceed with a realization that the separation of powers doctrine
leaves no alternative. The judicial branch of the government in the
Trimble case recognized this fact and followed the wise course of
non-interference.
2 1
FRANCIS SKIBA
Equitable Servitudes: Chattels-Plaintiff purchased from a rail-
road company a quantity of Kraft-brand fruit salad that had become
frozen in transit. Plaintiff agreed he would allow the goods to enter re-
tail outlets under the Kraft label. Plaintiff then sold the merchandise
to a wholesaler with the restriction that the goods were to be removed
from the jars and the jars with caps and cases were to be returned to
plaintiff. Subsequently, a wholesaler sold a portion of the goods to the
defendant. Although defendant had knowledge of the restriction at
the time of sale, he refused to comply with it and sold some of the
goods in the Kraft-jars to retailers. The trial court granted plaintiff
injunctive relief against the defendant upon the basis of broad equitable
19 104 Cong. Rec. 15695 (daily ed. July 31, 1958).
2 Supra note 13 at 5.
21 Occasionally, recognition of the importance of the separation of powers
doctrine in the area of federal records proceeds from Congress. In May of
1948, a resolution came up in the House of Representatives which would have
required the executive department and agencies of the Federal Government,
which had been created by Congress, and those serving in them, to make
available to Congress information which would enable it to legislate, provided
that the request was made by a majority vote of the committee seeking the
information and had been approved by either the Speaker or the president
pro tempore of the Senate. During the debate on the resolution, Representa-
tive Rayburn admonished the House: "Pass this resolution. The President
says to his cabinet officer, 'No, you are my agent, you are my alter ego; do
not give that information to Congress.' What are you going to do about it?
You might have an unseemly row upon the floor of the House of Repre-
sentatives. What are you going to do about it? Are you going to impeach the
President of the United States because he says that the giving up of certain
information is not in the public interest?" This reply can be found in H. Rep.
No. 1461, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. 19, 20 (1958).
[Vol. 44
RECENT DECISIONS
principles. The California Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
trial court for plaintiff on the ground that the facts warranted an appli-
cation of the equitable servitude doctrine to chattels. Nadell & Co. v.
Grasso, 175 Adv. Cal. App. 449, 346 P. 2d 505 (1959).
One element necessary for the application of the doctrine to chattels
was knowledge of the restrictive agreement by the third party (defend-
ant). Privity of contract was not essential, and the doctrine rested in
the real property principle of dominant tenement." In reality, the
dominant tenement is that property benefited by the restrictive agree-
ment. In the application of the real property doctrine to personalty,
the dominant tenement was the good will of the business.2 Thus, the
transition of the real property doctrine to personalty was completed.
The court followed equitable principles of relief when it enforced
the restriction. Thus, it found that the remedy at law was inadequate
3
and the performance of the restriction did not cause any unreasonable
burden to the defendant.4
The doctrine of equitable servitudes had its origin in land contracts
in a nineteenth century English case.5 The court held that in the sale
of land the vendor could make restrictions as to its use, and future
purchasers who had knowledge of the restrictions would have to comply
with them. The restrictions would be enforced in equity independently
of the question of whether or not it ran with the land.6 The basis of
the Tulk7 decision was that inequities in prices would arise by letting
the vendee sell the property to another who would not have to comply
with the restrictions." This decision was followed by the California
1 For a discussion of this real property principle applied to chattels see Ames,
Specific Performnance For and Against Strangers to the Contract, 17 Harv.
L. Rev. 174, 181 (19034) and Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41
Harv. L. Rev. 945, 964 (1928). Public policy considerations should be the
basis for the application of this principle. 18 B. U. L. Rev. 441 (1938), 22
Minn. L. Rev. 559 (1938) and Chafee, The Music Goes Round and Round:
Equitable Servitudes and Chattels, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1250 (1956); cf., 22
Colum. L. Rev. 351 (1922) and 36 Harv. L. Rev. 107 (1922). Camrpare Giddings,
Land, Restrictions Upon the Use Of, 5 Harv. L. Rev. 274 (1891-2) zith 17
Harv. L. Rev. 415 (1904).
See Restatement, Property §§454-456 (1944). For reasons against dominant
tenement as the legal principle that underlies the equitable servitude doctrine,
see Stone, The Equitable Rights and Liabilities of Strangers to a Contract,
18 Colum. L. Rev. 291, 309 (1918).
2 Good will is considered a property interest; Smith v. Bull, 50 Cal. 2d 294,
325 P.2d 463 (1958).
- 1 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §217 at 367 (5th ed. 1941).
4 Anderson v. Neal Institutes Co., 37 Cal. App. 174, 173 P. 779 (1918) ; Poultry
Producers of Southern California, Inc., v. Barlow, 189 Cal. 278, 208 Pac. 93(1922).
5 Tulk v. Moxhay, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848). See Clark, Equitable Servitudes,
16 Mich. L. Rev. 90 (1917-8).
6 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, §1295 at 846 (5th ed. 1941).
7 Supra note 5.
8 However, see Clark Equity §109 at 141-42 (1954).
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Court in applying the equitable servitude doctrine to real estate trans-
actions.9
Two subsequent early English cases broadened the application of
the restrictive agreements to include chattels. In one case, the plaintiff
entered into a charter with a shipowner for the purpose of making a
voyage. Later the ship was mortgaged to the defendant with knowledge
of the charter. When the defendant wanted to interfere with the
voyage, he was enjoined by the court. 10 In the other case, the plaintiff
was a patentee who had granted the patent under a contract which re-
quired the grantee and his assigns to pay a fixed percentage of the net
profits to the plaintiff. Upon the failure of the defendant, the assignee
of the patent, to make payments to the plaintiff, the court held the
defendant liable to an accounting." Jessel, M.R., stated that there was
an obligation running with the patent. His view did not represent the
reasoning of his associates on the Court of Appeal although they had
agreed with him in the granting of the accounting."
With some exceptions, 13 the English courts then all but struck re-
strictive agreements from the list of enforceable equitable devices.
Price maintenance was not generally recognized by th English courts.
A tobacco manufacturer who had sold packet tobaccos subject to printed
terms and conditions fixing a minimum price was unable to enforce
the proviso against a third party.'4 Later the court refused to grant
9 Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 183 Pac. 945 (1919) ; Marra v. Aetna Con-
struction Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 101 P. 2d 490 (1940).
lo De Mattos v. Gibson, 4 De G. & J. 276, 282, 45 Eng. Rep. 108, 110 (Ch. 1858).
"... where a man, by gift or purchase, acquires property from another, with
knowledge of a previous contract, lawfully and for valuable consideration
made by him with a third person, to use and employ the property for a par-
ticular purpose in a specified manner, the acquirer shall not, to the material
damage of the third person, in opposition to the contract and inconsistently
with it, use and employ the property in a manner not allowable to the giver
or seller. This rule, applicable alike in general as I conceive to movable and
immovable property,.... See Wade, Restriction on User, 44 Law Quarterly
Rev. 51, 52 (1928).
11 Werderman v. Socit6 G~n~rale d' lectricit6, 19 Ch. D. 246, 251, 252 (1881).
"... the parties intended certain liabilities to attach to the patent itself . . .
it is quite plain that nobody could take the patent with notice of that arrange-
ment, and say we will keep all the profits and will not be liable to account. .. "
See Keasbey, Restrictive Covenants as Applied to Territorial Rights in Pat-
ented Articles, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1896-7).
12 Ibid.
13 Usually listed as exceptions are restrictions involving "tied houses" and the
Lunley doctrine. "Tied house" restrictions are agreements between a brewer
and the owner of a public house stipulating that the owner would buy beer
exclusively from the brewer. These restrictions were upheld against subse-
quent owners. John Bros. Abergarw Brewery Co. v. Holmes. [1900] 1 Ch.
188; Osborne v. Bradley [1903] 2 Ch. 446. Cf., Stone, The Equitable
Rights and Liabilities of Strangers to a Contract, 18 Colum. L. Rev. 291
(1918). See, however, 2 American Law of Property §9.32 at 428 (1952). The
Lumley doctrine holds that a stranger to a contract is liable in tort for in-
ducing its breach. "Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & B1. 215, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (K.B.
1853). Cf., 42 Law Quarterly Rev. 139 (1926) and Chafee, Equitable Servi-
tudes on Chattels, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 945, 969 (1928).
14 Taddy v. Sterious, [1904] 1 Ch. 354.
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an injunction against a third party who had sold rubber heels below
the minimum price stipulated by the manufacturer on the lid of each
box.' 5
Restrictions on patented articles imposed by the owner of the patent
were upheld by the English courts.1 A patentee was allowed to enforce
price and use restrictions on his patented article against third parties.' 7
Restrictions placed upon copyrights were less favorably situated than
those placed upon patents. An author who had assigned to a publishing
company the exclusive right to publish his book could not hold a sub-
sequent assignee of the right liable for royalties. The right of royalties,
the court explained, did not extend to third parties.'8 However, in
another case concerning copyrights, the court enjoined a publishing
company from publishing a particular book when the author made a
prior agreement with another publisher to print it. The injunction was
granted on the ground that the first publisher had an interest in the
property of the copyright against third parties. 19
In the United States, restrictive agreements20 on chattels received
some consideration by the courts although they seldom spoke in terms
of equitable servitudes. Restrictive agreements involving patented
articles were generally not enforced.2 ' The statutory monopoly granted
15 McGruther v. Pitcher, [1904] 2 Ch. 306.
2ONational Phonograph Co. v. 'Menck, [1911], A.C. 336, 350, where the court
in quoting from Incandescent Gas Light Co. v. Cantelo, [1895] 12 R. Pat.
Cas. 262, said "The sale of a patented article carries with it the right to
use it in any way that the purchaser chooses to use it, unless he knows of
restrictions. Of course, if he knows of restrictions and they are brought to
his mind at the time of the sale, he is bound by them. He is bound by them
on this principle: the patentee has the sole right of using and selling the
articles, and he may prevent anybody from dealing with them at all. In-
as much as he has the right to prevent people from using them or dealing
in them at all, he has the right to do the lesser thing, that is to say, to im-
pose his own conditions. It does not matter how unreasonable or how absurd
the conditions are.....
'7 Ibid. Cf., Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 945,
955 (1928) for additional patent cases.is Barker v. Stickney, [1919] 1 K-B. 121.
19 Erskine Macdonald v. Eyles, [1921], 1 Ch. 631.
20 Note that the various types of restrictive agreements on chattels include,
but are not limited to, price maintenance restrictions, territorial restrictions,
resale restrictions, use restrictions and tying restrictions. Chafee, Equitable
Servitudes on Chattels, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 945, 948 (1928). The restriction can
be placed upon a common article of sale or upon an article which has been
granted a statutory monopoly such as patented or copyrighted articles. Re-
strictive agreements are usually placed upon chattels by a contract; however,
authorities agree that the doctrine of equitable servitudes had its origin in
contract. Stone, The Equitable Rights and Liabilities of Strangers to a
Contract, 18 Colum. L. Rev. 291, 295 (1918) ; 32 Ky. L. J. 309 (1944).
21 Boston Store of Chicago v. American Graphophone Co. et al, 246 U.S. 8
(1918) (price restriction); Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 243 U.S.
490 (1917) (price restriction) ; Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
M&fg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917) (tying restriction). Powell, The Nature of a
Patent Right, 17 Colum. L. Rev. 663 (1937); 25 Harv. L. Rev. 641; Keasbey,
Restrictive Covenants as Applied to Territorial Rights in Patented Articles,
10 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1896). One reason for upholding restrictions placed upon
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by the patent gave the patentee only the right to prevent others from
using, making or selling that which had been patented 22 and unlike the
English courts, 2 3 the courts in the United States did not include in the
granting of the patent the right to make restrictive agreements.
Restrictions placed upon copyrights2 4 were looked upon more favor-
ably than those placed upon patents.2 -5 In an early decision involving a
copyright it was held that an assignee of a copyright could not publish
more books than could his assignor, which number was fixed by a prior
contract with the author.25 In New York, a price restriction agreement
on a copyright book was enforced by the court. In that case, the pub-
lisher entered into a contract with the owner of a copyright to buy
plates of a prayer book and publish it at a stipulated price. When the
publisher sold the plates to another publisher, the subsequent publisher
was enjoined from selling the prayer book at a lower price than that
which was agreed upon by the first publisher.2 7 In another case involv-
ing a copyright, when the owner of a copyright of music was granted
royalties against a subsequent publisher, 28 Judge Augustus Hand stated:
"One who takes property with notice that it is to be used in a particular
way receives it subject to something resembling an equitable servi-
tude." 29
A use restriction was upheld in New York when a purchaser ot a
machine with knowledge of a restrictive use agreement between the
seller and another was enjoined from using the machine contrary to
such restriction." However, use restrictions were generally disfavored
by the courts" as were tying restrictions.3 2
In a decision upholding a territorial restriction, the plaintiff sold a
statutory monopolies is that the defendant will not be able to avail himself
of the plaintiff's industry and gain a "free ride". 46 Harv. L. Rev. 1171, 1173
(1932); 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1419, 1424 (1934). See infra note 38.(1932) ; 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1419, 1424 (1934). See infra note 38.
22 Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1912).
23 See supra note 16.
24 61 Stat. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C. §1 (1958).
25 See Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl. 631(1937) (use restriction). However, see earlier decisions, Jeweler's Mercantile
Agency v. Jeweler's Weekly, 155 N.Y. 241, 49 N.E. 872 (1898) (publication
restriction) and Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908) (price
restriction). The distinction between limited and general publication is dis-
cussed in Werkmeister v. American Lithograph, 134 Fed. 321 (2d Cir. 1904)
and Berry v. Hoffman 125 Pa. Sup. 261, 189 Atl. 516 (1937).
26 In Re Rider et al, 16 R.I. 271, 15 Atl. 72 (1888).
-M Murphy v. Christian Press Ass'n. Pub. Co., 38 App. Div. 426, 56 N.Y.S. 597
(1899).
28 In re Waterson, Berlin & Snyder Co., 48 F. 2d 704 (2d Cir. 1931).
29 Id. at 708.30 New York Bank-Note Co. v. Hamilton Bank Note Engraving & Printing Co.,
83 Hun. 593, 31 N.Y.S. 1060 (1895).
31 National Skee-Ball Co. v. Seyfried, 110 N.J. Eq. 18, 158 Atl. 736 (1932); In
Re Consolidated Factors Corp., 46 F. 2d 561 (S.D. N.Y. 1931) (restrictive sale
of stock) ; Garst v. Hall, 179 Mass. 588, 61 N.E. 219 (1901) and Coca-Cola Co.
v. Bennett, 238 Fed. 513 (8th Cir. 1916) (trademark restriction).3 2 Motion Picture Co. v. Universal Film, 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
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quantity of inferior quality cigarettes to a certain company on the con-
dition that they would not be resold in the United States. Subsequently,
the defendant purchased the cigarettes with knowledge of the restric-
tion and imported a portion of them into this country; however, he
was enjoined by the court from selling more.33
California's first application of the equitable servitude doctrine to
personalty was in the Nadell decision although the state recognized
price restrictive agreements on chattels as early as 1909.34 In upholding
the price restriction the California Supreme Court stated: "There is
nothing either unreasonable or unlawful in the effort by a manu-
facturer to maintain a standard price for his goods.""5
Price restrictions were extended by the court to third parties with
notice in a later decision.3 6 These two cases prepared the way for the
constitutional validity of the fair trade laws in that state.3 7
Price fixing3 s under the Sherman Act 9 was generally considered
a restraint of trade by the courts.4 0 The McGuire Act4' which amended
the Sherman Act gave the manufacturers and vendors the right to stip-
ulate resale prices within reasonable limitations. Violations of these
price fixing contracts were remedied by injunctive relief.
Although not all states have adopted fair trade laws,4 2 among those
33 P. Lorillard Co. v. Weingarden, 280 Fed. 238 (W.D.N.Y. 1922). Cf., Russel
v. Tilghman, 275 Fed. 235 (E.D. Va. 1921).
34 Grogan v. Chaffee, 156 Cal. 611, 105 Pac. 745 (1909).
35 Id. at 747.
36 D. Ghirardelli Co. v. Hunsicker et al, 164 Cal. 355, 128 Pac. 1041. (1912).
37 Max Factor & Co. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal. 2d 446, 55 P. 2d 177 (1936) ; Scovill
Manufacturing Co. v. Skaggs Pay Less Drugs, 45 Cal. 2d 881, 291 P. 2d
936 (1955).
3sNote that since Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp.,
299 U.S. 183 (1936), which upheld the Illinois fair trade laws, the courts
have looked more favorably upon price fixing agreements as applied to third
parties. Thus, the year 1936 marks the date in which the equitable servitude
doctrine was given new life inasmuch as fair trade laws are considered a
type of equitable servitude. Chafee, The Music Goes Round and Round:
Equitable Servitudes and Chattels, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1250, 1255 (1956). Com-
pare the date of cases cited with 1936 and also determine whether the state
in which the case was decided has upheld the constitutionality of the fair
trade laws as applied to third parties. See infra notes 42 and 43.
-3 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §1.4 0 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911);
Annot., 7 A.L.R. 449 (1920); Annot., 19 A.L.R. 925 (1922); Annot., 32
A.L.R. 1087 (1924); Annot., 103 A.L.R. 1331 (1936); Annot., 125 A.L.R.
1335 (1940) and Annot., 64 A.L.R. 2d 758 (1959).
4166 Stat. 631 (1952), 15 U.S.C. §45(a)(3). The Sherman Act was changed
by the Miller-Tyding Amendment, 50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. §1, which
validated resale price maintenance contracts in interstate commerce, thus
placing them beyond the sanctions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. In 1952,
the McGuire Act specifically exempted nonsigner provisions from the Sher-
man Act. The McGuire Act was held constitutional in Norman M. Morris
Corp. v. Hess Bros., Inc., 243 F. 2d 274 (3d Cir. 1956); 64 A.L.R. 2d 750(1959).
42 The states that do not have fair trade laws: Alaska, Missouri, Nebraska,
Texas and Vermont. The states that have passed fair trade laws, but do
not have rulings concerning their constitutionality as to nonsigners: Ala-
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states which have them there exists a difference of opinion as to the
constitutionality of price restrictions against third parties (non-
signers). 43 A factor in predicting whether a court will recognize the
application of the equitable servitude doctrine to chattels is whether
the court has previously upheld the constitutionality of price fixing
agreements as applied to nonsigners. For example, the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Dr. G. H. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann
Brothers Giant Super Markets44 declared that the extension of the fair
trade laws to include nonsigners is unconstitutional and the court also
stated :
Equitable Servitudes running with a movable and restraints
on the alienation of movable property are disfavored under the
public policy of this State. Once a movable is sold, the seller
relinquishes all interest therein and conditional sales whereby the
vendor retains title to the property, are not recognized in Loui-
siana.
45
On the other hand, California, which was the first state to adopt the
fair trade laws and further upheld their constitutionality against non-
signers, recognized without difficulty the doctrine of equitable servi-
tudes applied to chattels.4 6
The two major devices employed to effectuate restrictive agree-
ments on chattels are equitable servitudes and sub-contracts. Of the
two devices, the equitable servitude device has many advantages over
the other. One of the advantages is that the right which exists in
equitable servitudes is a right in rein whereas in sub-contracts there
exists only a right in personam.4 I Therefore, the restriction can be en-
forced regardless of whether privity of contract exists between the
owner of the right in rem and the person who has not respected this
right. The non-contractual nature of the equitable servitude device
would eliminate the necessity of overseeing that the restriction is con-
tinued by a series of sub-contracts. Of course, the continuance of a
restriction by means of sub-contracts is more burdensome when third
parties are reluctant to accept them or to continue them. The sub-con-
tract device becomes even more cumbersome when the volume of sales
increases.
bama, Idaho, Maine, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia
and Wyoming. CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 553003 and 10,000.
43The states that have upheld the constitutionality of the fair trade laws as to
nonsigners: Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota and Wis-
consin. The states that have rejected the nonsigner clause as being uncon-
stitutional: Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, South Carolina, Utah, Washington and West Virginia. CCH
Trade Reg. Rep. 553003, 10,000.
44 231 La. 51, 90 So. 2d 343 (1956), 60 A.L.R. 2d 410.
45M. at 350.
-1 Nadell & Co. v. Grasso, 175 Adv. Cal. App. 449, 346 P. 2d 505 (1959).
472 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, §429 at 198 (5th ed. 1941).
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The equitable seritude device may be useful in protecting a manu-
facturer from suits of breach of warranty by allowing him to have his
labels removed by a wholesaler or retailer before the goods are sold to
the consumer. Manufacturers have been held liable for their products
when they were not up to the standard indicated by the label.48 Thus,
the risk of liability would be placed upon the retailer if the goods are
faulty and are sold without a label. However, if the manufacturer's
label is not removed he could possibly recover damages" from the one
who had the duty to remove the labels and also by the use of the equit-
able servitude device he could enjoin him from putting more of his
labelled goods on the market.50
CONCLUSION
The application of real estate principles to personalty is not unusual
in equity courts. The rights of a cestui que trust developed in real
estate, but now the majority of trust property consists of personalty.51
Other notable equitale interests in personal property that had their
origin in land are specific performance in the sale of certain chattels
and the interest created by a contract to deliver certain chattels.
5 2
Therefore, the extension of the real property doctrine of quitable ser-
vitudes to include chattels has had early precedents.
Thus, the California Supreme Court in applying a real estate princi-
ple to chattels was one of the first courts to speak in terms of equitable
servitudes. Prior to this decision, the development of the law concern-
ing restrictive agreements placed upon personalty was conflicting both
as to the legal principle upon which these agreements rested and as to
the justification of certain types of restrictions. Although the far
reaching effect of the decision in the principal case remains to be seen,
it will undoubtedly give the doctrine of equitable servitudes as applied
to chattels more clarity as well as new impetus.
THOMAS W. BERTZ
Practice: Equitable Relief from Suit in an Inconvenient Form-
Plaintiffs brought an action in Walker County, Georgia, to enjoin de-
fendants as residents of Walker County from prosecuting a pending
action in the Circuit Court of Tennessee against the plaintiffs for
damages arising out of an alleged cause of action originating in Walker
-8 Lane v. C. A. Swanson & Sons, 130 Cal. App, 2d 210, 278 P. 2d 723 (1955) ;
Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 105 Ohio App. 53, 139 N.E. 2d 871(1957), aff'd, 167 Ohio 244, 147 N.E. 2d 612 (1958).
49 1 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §112 at 147 (5th ed. 1941).
50 Note that the use of the equitable servitude device for this purpose might
not be upheld by the courts because it might be contrary to public policy
especially when the merchandise is food and drink. See supra note 1.
51 Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 945, 960 (1928).
-2Lord Strathcona Steamship Co. v. Dominion Coal Co., (1926) A.C. 108.
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